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Ottawa Dialogue makes further recommendations for India-Pakistan nuclear agreements

OTTAWA, December 22, 2011 — As a result of a recent meeting in Copenhagen, a group of retired senior officials, military officers and academics from India and Pakistan, led by University of Ottawa professor Peter Jones (Graduate School of Public and International Affairs), has adopted a list of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs).

The members of this group, known as the “**Ottawa Dialogue**,” put forth these proposals for their governments to consider in upcoming official discussions on nuclear confidence-building.

The CBMs adopted in Copenhagen (see document below) cover both military issues related to nuclear weapons and topics related to civilian nuclear cooperation in areas such as medicine and agriculture.

These measures are a follow-up to the ones adopted at a meeting in Palo Alto, California, in July 2011 and provide further details on possible agreements that could be reached between India and Pakistan.

The Copenhagen meeting was sponsored by the Danish foreign ministry and the Near East South Asia (NESAs) Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

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INFORMATION

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Practical Steps Towards Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting in Copenhagen, December 12-13, 2011) [\[External Source\]](#)

Following-on from their previous meetings, most recently the Stanford meeting in July of 2011 (final document attached), and recalling the Lahore Declaration and MOU of 1999, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue devoted their session in Copenhagen to the elaboration of specific and practical CBMs. In this context, they expressed the hope that the ideas outlined in this document will provide some positive inspiration to the official dialogue over nuclear CBMs. They were encouraged to learn that this dialogue is likely to commence in the near future.

The Copenhagen meeting discussed the impact of emerging technologies on strategic stability, focussing on the topics of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Cruise Missiles. The general sense was that agreements to restrain the development of these technologies are unlikely in the present atmosphere, although such controls would be desirable. Therefore, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue believe that the current focus should be on CBMs which could constrain destabilising deployment options and enhance stability in a future crisis.

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommend that their governments should:

- Initiate an official, ongoing high-level dialogue on the impact of BMD on regional security; and
- Add cruise missiles to the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.

More generally, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommended that their governments:

- Sign a CBM to the effect that their land-based nuclear arsenals will remain “de-mated” and “de-alerted” in peacetime;
- Initiate a high-level official dialogue over how new and emerging technologies, such as future sea-based systems and nuclear-armed cruise missiles, will impact upon strategic stability; and
- More generally, enter into a high-level official dialogue over “strategic sufficiency” – the question of how future nuclear force development can be kept to the lowest level consistent with national security needs.

In a focused discussion on how Communication CBMs could be enhanced, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue noted that communications CBMs must be effective in three different environments (peacetime, periods of escalation of tension and periods of conflict), and different measures and levels of communication may be required in these different phases of relations. To that end, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommended that:

- Existing hotlines and communications channels should be hardened, manned on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis and supplemented with secure video-links;
- A dedicated communications channel should be established between the Indian National Security Advisor and the Pakistani equivalent; and

- Each side should establish a “strategic risk management unit”, which could serve some of the same communications functions as Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in other contexts.

In the field of civilian nuclear cooperation, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue heard proposals from a working group on the subjects of cooperation in nuclear medicine and nuclear agriculture, particularly concerning issues faced in common by the two countries. In both cases, specific proposals were advanced, which are attached. The members of the Ottawa Dialogue strongly recommend these cooperative research projects, which have the potential to improve the lives of peoples in both countries, to their governments. They further recommended that a bilateral framework should exist to facilitate such projects, and that these projects should not be hostage to the vicissitudes of the broader relationship.

There was a discussion of possible cooperation on such areas as the safe operation of nuclear power plants and the security of radioactive sources used in medical and industrial applications. There was consensus that the safe operation of nuclear power plants would be a suitable area for future work in the Ottawa Dialogue, but not on the matter of nuclear security.

Finally, the participants expressed the hope that there would be no conflict between the two countries. However in the event of a conventional conflict breaking out they agreed that all efforts should be made to prevent an escalation of the conflict and suggested that, in addition to the faithful implementation of the agreement on non attack on nuclear facilities, both sides should also refrain from attacks on sensitive locations, a list of which should be drawn up immediately.

Participants from South Asia at the Copenhagen, December, 2011 meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue:

Uday Bhaskar, Commodore, retired, Indian Navy;

Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force;

Tariq Ghazi, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan;

Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

PC Kesavan, Professor Emeritus, IGNOU, Distinguished Fellow, MS Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF);

Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

Riaz Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

LV Krishnan, former Director, Safety Research and Health Physics Programmes at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research;

Vikram Lele, Chief of Nuclear Medicine, Jaslok Hospital and research center;

Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India;

Talat Masood, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

Mujtaba Naqvi, former head of Pakistan's Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology;

Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Centre, Atlantic Council of the United States; Washington, DC;

Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute;

Iqbal Qureshi, Scientist Emeritus PAK AEC, former member (technical) PAK AEC and Director General PINSTECH Research Centre;

Qasim Qureshi, Major General, retired, Pakistan Army, formerly with the Strategic Plans Division;

Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

Arun Sahgal, Brigadier, retired, Indian Army;

Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command); and

Moeed Yusuf, South Asia Adviser, USIP.

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Copenhagen:

Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division;

Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy; and

TV Paul, Professor, McGill University

Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, July 6-8, 2011) **[External Source]**

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue are heartened by the fact that high-level official talks on nuclear CBMs have begun once again. We encourage the governments to continue them and to supplement them with regular meetings of high-level officials from the military and intelligence fields in order to broaden the dialogue and establish mechanisms to further understanding and prevent escalation of tension. We also encourage the two countries to continue to observe their respective moratoria on nuclear testing.

It is important to note that nuclear CBMs cannot succeed independent of broader steps to ease the relationship. These must include conventional military CBMs/restraint measures and steps to encourage people-to-people engagements. While these broader matters are not in the purview of the Ottawa Dialogue, we recognize that they are essential to the CBMs we are suggesting here.

Thus, we recognize that some of the CBMs we advocate cannot be undertaken in the absence of measures to stabilize other aspects of the relationship. But we believe that others can be and will contribute to the creation of a "virtuous cycle;" an atmosphere in which progressively more ambitious steps can be taken in all fields of confidence-building.

Finally, there should be an informed public dialogue on the subject of the implications of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and of the opportunity costs which attend the continuation of an uncontrolled nuclear rivalry. Such a dialogue should also include discussions of the underlying causes of the dispute.

On the subject of nuclear CBMs, we offer the following list of possible CBMs as ones that we believe could be considered by the governments.

Unilateral and/or Bilateral Declaratory Steps:

- Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;
- Assurances that "bolt from the blue" surprise nuclear attacks will not be planned for or undertaken;
- Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches (such as a mutual commitment to maintain the practice of the separation of warheads from delivery systems);
- Commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems; and
- Building on the agreement not to attack nuclear facilities, assurances that sensitive targets will be avoided in the case of conventional conflict.

Strategic Restraint Measures:

- Agreement to develop and adopt a common terminology on strategic issues;
- Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;
- Agreement to include cruise missiles in the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles;
- Agreement that missile flight tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;

- Agreement to test missiles only from notified ranges in notified directions;
- Agreement to enter into a dialogue concerning Ballistic Missile Defence in which views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability will be explored; and
- Agreement to enter into a regular dialogue on the impact of the introduction of new technologies on strategic stability.

Communication Measures:

- Agreement to expeditiously set up nuclear risk reduction centres (though possibly not under this name), through a comprehensive agreement, specifying the staffing, communication and functional aspects;
- Agreement to upgrade the existing hotlines to introduce redundant and assured communications which can be activated at the request of either party;
- Agreement to ensure a daily communication exchange when demanded by either party;
- Agreement to harden each side's communication lines downwards to provide protected and assured communications; and
- Agreement to establish consultative mechanisms as required to implement these CBMs.

Physical Measures:

- Agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons;
- Agreement to retire the Hatf 1 and Prithvi 1 short-range systems;
- Agreement that the Hatf 2 and Prithvi 2 will be designated as conventional-only systems; and
- Agreement to forego MIRVing of nuclear missiles.

Cooperation between the civilian nuclear establishments:

- Agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;
- Agreement to share different experiences in creating and running Nuclear Regulatory Authorities;
- Agreement (bilateral or regional) on cooperation and exchange of safety related information of Nuclear Power Plants;
- Agreement to cooperatively develop civilian nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture and medicine in such areas as:
 - Plant strains with characteristics of high yield and resistance to pest, disease, drought, and salinity.
 - Animal health through improved vaccines
 - Extension of shelf life of perishable foods
 - Practices for prevention and early detection of cancer
 - Practices for treatment of acute radiation sickness

Participants from South Asia at the Palo Alto meeting of the "Ottawa Dialogue:"

Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division

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Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; and

Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command).

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Palo Alto:

Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force (prepared a background paper on nuclear transparency for the Stanford meeting, but was not able to attend);

Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan (prepared a background paper on nuclear CBMs for the Stanford meeting, but was not able to attend);

Amitabh Mattoo, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (prepared a background paper on nuclear CBMs for the Stanford meeting, but was not able to attend); and

Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.